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The four‐year long struggle by Yong Vui Kong to challenge his mandatory death sentence reveals 
how life and death decisions can turn on legal niceties. For instance, on 20 November 2009, the 
President of the Republic of Singapore turned down Yong's plea for clemency and this news was 
conveyed to the prisoner's brother by his then lawyer three days later. Along with this sad 
information, he was told that his brother would be hung on 4 December 2009. Yong's brother then 
engaged the respected human rights advocate, M. Ravi, who was granted an interview with the 
prisoner two days prior to the scheduled execution. Ravi, as a matter of urgency, filed a motion 
challenging the constitutionality of capital punishment and at the same time sought a stay of execution 
so that his arguments would not be, tragically, moot. On 3 December 2009, the day before the gallows 
would swing, Woo Bih Li J heard an urgent stay application to enable the appeal questions to be 
argued at a later date. After listing a series of procedural particularities that may have denied the court 
jurisdiction or capacity, the judge stated that ‘fortunately for Yong’ there existed an additional 
enabling provision in the Criminal Procedure Code (revised edition 2012, chapter 68, Section 251); 
that while no appeal could act as a stay of execution, the court could put a stay on carrying through 
the sentence on such terms ‘as to security for the payment of any money or the performance or non‐
performance of any act, or the suffering of any punishment … as to the court seem reasonable’ (Yong 
Vui Kong v. Public Prosecutor ([2009] SGHC 274) at [3]). The stay was granted. After this 
determination, Ravi had the following hurdles to jump: (i) to have an extension of time granted to 
appeal; (ii) to argue that a further appeal was possible following on from the convention that the 
accused had given up his right to appeal having preferred to seek clemency; and (iii) to argue the 
merits of an appeal in a jurisdiction where challenges on constitutionality had never previously been 
successful. Even as Yong's life depended on the procedural determination of one judge, one day 
before he would have been killed for a crime he continues to deny, the life of the prisoner ongoing 
was maintained through years of unsuccessful legal argument. 
 
What makes this life and death legality even more tenuous are the details of the decision points in the 
prisoner's application to allow an appeal on constitutional legality (Yong Vui Kong v. Public 
Prosecutor ([2009] SGCA 640)). When considering whether the High Court judge had the power she 
claimed to grant a stay of execution, the Court of Appeal said ‘no’. Instead, it ruled that the stay 
application should have been attached to the appeal, which the prisoner's lawyer had omitted to do, 
and that failure was enough in the prosecution argument to deny the stay application. If such had been 
the outcome of that motion before the High Court, the prisoner almost certainly would have hung, as 
the Court of Appeal reiterated the extraordinary position that appeal applications at law do not have 
the ancillary effect of delaying judgment. 
  
 
This case reveals many things about the mandatory death penalty. There is not time here to critically 
canvass the issues of individual and constitutional integrity raised by the prisoner in the long journey 
of challenging the original sentence: questions such as the fundamental right to life, the 
constitutionality of cruel and unusual punishments, the impact of customary international law, and the 
questionable deterrent effect of such mandatory sentences.i Rather, this comment has confined itself to 
the somewhat disturbing executive, judicial and legislative history of Yong's struggle to escape the 
gallows. If we reflect on the position around late 2009 and early 2010: 
 The prosecutor was vigorously arguing for the sentence to be carried out. 
 The executive, through the mouth of the Law Minister, was telling the public that mercy in 
this case would stimulate future crime. 
 The judiciary was denying all grounds of appeal, both procedural and legal. 
 The prerogative of mercy was being determined by executive decision making which the 
court refused to review, while at the same time denying the prisoner access to the materials 
before the cabinet and the President in making their decision, denying the application of 
procedural fairness. 
When commenting on the rationale behind the legislative move to create the recently‐enacted saving 
conditions from which Yong may yet benefit, the Law Minister deflected suggestions that the 
government was applying a more lenient approach to human rights and said that the reform did no 
more than reflect the government's regular statutory review procedures, whereby laws may be 
‘tweaked’ to improve their operation.ii Even so, the irony cannot be lost. The court very recently 
accepted that Yong was acting in no greater capacity than a low‐level courier; they accordingly 
commuted his sentence to life imprisonment and 15 strokes of the cane. The vehicle for returning the 
decision to the court was a certificate of substantive assistance which is both determined and awarded 
by the prosecutorial agencies which would have previously seen to it that Yong was executed. The 
legislation enabling this executive determination was drafted and passed by a similar government to 
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i All these matters were the subject of judicial determination particularly in the Court of Appeal decision Yong 
Vui Kong v. Public Prosecutor and another matter ([2010] SGCA 20). At another time we will analyse and 
critique the soundness of several such decisions. 
ii In an interview with Yahoo Singapore before the amendments were passed, the Law Minister said of this 
review process, in denying that it had been a result of activist campaigning: ‘This is something we do 
continuously. We monitor to see firstly, is it necessary, because it’s a serious penalty. Secondly, is it effective? 
And, thirdly, are there tweaks or changes that need to be done to this system. . . . Any responsible government 
will do this – which is what we are doing’ (Tan 2012). 
                                                          
